And yet, against the countless person-years of effort that have gone into refining and codifying the methodology for quantifying one risk at a time, there has been virtually no progress in developing principles and methods for quantifying risk comparisons.
Comparative risk assessment (CRA) is too important to do poorly. Not only do government agencies use CRA to influence the way people think about different risks, but they are increasingly using it to make irrevocable choices about which risks to control and which to accept. Government must decide, for example, whether to promote, mandate, or restrict alternative fuels such as methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) for automobiles; its only choice is whether to use CRA to compare gasoline and MTBE or instead to make the decision on intuitive, political, or other grounds. Either way, choices such as these will be made, but reliance on a misleading analytic tool might be worse than undertaking no analysis at all.
At its current state of development, however, CRA may be sufficiently flawed that on balance it causes more harm than good. Decision-makers cannot use CRA without asking whether merely knowing which of two risks is statistically larger is sufficient to guide regulatory policy or individual choice. Even putting this aside, however, there remains a purely scientific question: With current methods of CRA, would we know a "larger" risk when we saw it?
This article explores a largely unrecognized but fundamental flaw in how CRAs are performed, using a well-known risk comparison-the allegation that exposure to the naturally occurring carcinogen aflatoxin was definitely and substantially riskier than exposure to the pesticide Alar-to demonstrate the implications of analytic overconfidence. From this example, general lessons will be gleaned to offer an improved paradigm for comparing environmental risks.
Background
CRA fell into some disrepute during the last decade, largely because one particular form of it, the quantitative contrasting of markedly dissimilar risks [such as being overweight versus being exposed to benzene (1) ], was increasingly regarded as unresponsive to important perceptual judgments and hence as needlessly manipulative (2, 3) . Nevertheless, many other brands of CRA have flourished during the same period, while CRA of dissimilar risks seems to be making a comeback of late (4, 5) . In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between what could be termed "small" and "large" versions of CRA. The former involves the quantitative comparison of single risks that are generally less dissimilar than the overweight/benzene sort of comparison. Prominent examples of different types of "small" uses of CRA include the ranking of various hazardous waste sites in the Hazard Ranking System developed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the analysis of "risk/risk tradeoffs" such as the choice between cancer risks due to the disinfection of drinking water and pathogenic risks due to the failure to disinfect (6) , and the ranking of various common pollutants (both naturally-occurring and synthetic), either in order of inherent toxicologic potency or of excess risk under specified exposure conditions ().
"Large" CRA involves the comparison of categories of risks and is increasingly being invoked as a means of putting the United States' allegedly haphazard environmental priorities in a "rational" sequence (8) (9) (10) (11) . For example, a recent magazine article cites as strong evidence that "we still haven't figured out what is really worth worrying about" the disparity between the $0.1 billion society spends annually on controlling indoor radon, which EPA estimates may cause as many as 20,000 lung cancer deaths each year, and the $6 billion spent on cleaning up hazardous waste sites, which purportedly cause fewer than 500 annual cancer deaths (12).
..* .. ... -I and easy to botch, the major obstacle is not the qualitative differences between risks, but a completely different and largely ignored problem: the uncertainty in quantitative risk magnitude. Ironically, critics of CRA thus may well be right, but for the wrong reasons.
The impotence of the accusation of incommensurability is relatively easy to demonstrate. We all routinely compare highly dissimilar states by the simple (at least conceptually) cognitive process that involves: 1) disaggregating each situation or choice into its salient attributes (in the literal apple/orange comparison, these would be price, taste, nutritive value, appearance, etc.); 2) gauging how much of each attribute each situation or choice embodies; 3) assessing how much we value each attribute; and 4) aggregating the individual value judgments into a composite evaluation for comparison.
So apples and oranges are not incommensurable at all, and neither are disparate risks to health. In fact, when researchers tested empirically the most widely accepted predictions about how laypeople were supposed to react to various kinds of risk comparisons, the responses either did not support or else contradicted the thesis that the more dissimilar the comparison, the less acceptable and more aggravating the recipients would find it (3, 15) . For The further irony in this situation is that the analytic tool for making honest comparisons of uncertain risks-quantitative uncertainty analysis-is already well developed but languishes unused for this important application. For almost as long as risk assessment has existed, researchers have used tools such as expert judgment, Bayesian analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the uncertainty surrounding single risks (16,1X) . These uncertainties arise, among other sources, from our inability to measure precisely the quantities that drive the risk assessment models we use (parameter uncertainty) and from our inability to know which of two or more alternative models is in fact correct or most useful (model uncertainty each of the three inputs for each risk estimate can be described more correctly by a probability density function (PDF) than by an arbitrary point estimate, the raw material for a more sound approach to CRA entails first deriving these PDFs and then combining them to yield an estimate of the risk ratio with its associated uncertainty. Combining the PDFs is now computationally simple, with the advent of microcomputers to perform Monte Carlo simulation. In this method, a value from each PDF is chosen at random via an algorithm that ensures that the probability of selecting any value is the same as the underlying probability in the PDF. A single Monte Carlo iteration consists of a random draw from each PDF followed by the appropriate functional combination thereof (in this case, multiplication of three numbers to estimate each risk, followed by division of one risk estimate by the other). With repeated iterations (20, (27) . This survey of almost 38,000 persons, including 1,719 children ages 3-5, provides information on the average quantity of each foodstuff consumed each day, and also gives seven percentile points of the cumulative distribution of consumption across the population. In this analysis, the PDF for peanut butter consumption was well-approximated via a lognormal distribution with a median of 8 g/day and logarithmic standard deviation aln= 0.84. The data on apple juice consumption were also well approximated by a lognormal PDF with a median of 83 g/day and a logarithmic standard deviation of 1.0. For reference, the point estimates of consumption Ames (19) (30) .
Residue levels for UDMH in apple juice were provided courtesy of the Uniroyal Chemical Company (31) . Uniroyal analyzed 71 samples of apple juice for UDMH content; the juice came from the 1985 or 1986 apple crops. The sample mean was 13.8 ppb, and the maximum concentration was 83 ppb. [There is a separate category of "baby apple juice," the small jars that infants (and some toddlers) consume. The mean UDMH content in the 71 samples of baby apple juice was nearly twice that of the adult product, and the maximum single value was 112 ppb (31). Thus, using only "adult" apple juice data tends to underestimate both the relative and absolute risk of UDMH exposure.] Due to the small number of samples and the fact that the data clumped into at least four modal groups (35 of the 71 values were clustered either around 1, 8, 13, or 33 ppb), the PDF used in the analysis consisted of the data points themselves; in the Monte Carlo procedure, 1 of these 71 values was chosen at random at each iteration. Ames (19) apparently assumed that apple juice always contains about 7.5 ppb UDMH; this value lies at about the 45th percentile of the distribution of measured residue levels.
Carcinogenic potency. The most difficult portion of the analysis was the generation of the PDFs for cancer potency, as no standard methods currently exist for deriving such distributions (32) . Two different methods were used here, reflecting the distinction between a "known human carcinogen" (aflatoxin) and a substance (UDMH) for which only animal bioassay data are available.
The distribution for the potency of aflatoxin (Table 1) Table 1 ). In the @RISK spreadsheet, these normal distributions were truncated at zero so that negative values for potency could not occur. At each iteration in the Monte Carlo simulation, the potency of aflatoxin is determined with reference to f, the assumed prevalence of HBV-positive individuals in the population. According to the CalEPA report (33) (39) . Table 2 shows the results of the new UDMH bioassay; because individually coded data for each test animal were not available, only the primary tumor response (hemangiosarcomas plus hemangiomas) was considered, not the total number of animals with tumors at any site (this would include pulmonary neoplasms as well).
CalEPA recently completed an analysis of this bioassay (40) and calculated a potency value somewhat higher than EPA's. CalEPA used the tumor site that gave the highest UCL for potency, namely, pulmonary carcinomas/adenomas; here, EPA's assumptions about the appropriate data set were used, largely because the blood vessel tumors were so rare in the control animals, in contrast to the pulmonary tumors (35/100 pulmonary tumors among controls, as opposed to only 5/100 vascular tumors among controls).
The bootstrap resampling consisted of 5000 simulated data sets (see Table 3 
was defined as intake x residue concentration/body weight). Thus, the computations account for the possible sublinearity of the UDMH dose-response function and permit some probability that the risk to humans at low doses is essentially zero. Note that the new bioassay data give similar values for the potency of UDMH to those of the controversial Toth study (41), although the extent to which the new study should be interpreted as confirming, modifying, or invalidating the earlier one still seems to be a subject of controversy (42) (43) (44) . The maxiumum likelihood estimate and UCL for f1 in the Toth study (if adjusted to a 20-kg child) were 0.680 and 0.907, respectively. Table 4 summarizes some key parameters for each of the six input distributions. The sizes of the uncertainties in these parameters are typical of those encountered in previous assessments of the uncertainty in risks assessed singly. Several of the parame-
), while one (UDMH residue) varies by nearly 100-fold, and another (UDMH potency) is "infinitely uncertain" in the sense that its lower bound could be zero. For comparison, Finley et al. (45) suggested distributions for 12 of the parameters commonly encountered in more complicated multimedia exposure assessments. Some of the distributions they recommend are as tight as some of those in Table 4 (e.g., inhalation rates among adults vary between approximately 8 and 16 m3/day, to a 90% degree of confidence), while others (e.g., the number of years an individual is likely to live at one residence before moving) vary by more than 100-fold, and still others (e.g., the amount of soil a child ingests each day) resemble the UDMH potency distribution in that there is a nontrivial probability that zero is the true value.
Results Figure 1 shows the cumulative probability distribution functions (CDFs) for the excess lifetime risks of peanut butter and apple juice consumption. Selected summary statistics of these distributions are presented in Table 5 . The CDF for UDMH risk has a slightly higher median than the aflatoxin risk CDF, but because the former distribution has a much longer right-hand tail, its mean is nearly twice as high as the latter distribution's mean value.
The effect of this overlapping of the two risk distributions is shown in Figure 2 , which depicts the PDF for the common logarithm of the ratio of the UDMH risk to the aflatoxin risk. Several features of this PDF are noteworthy, in light of the deter- Risk {x 10-5) Figure 1 . Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the excess lifetime risk of peanut butter (blue curve) and apple juice ingestion (red curve). In either curve, the X-coordinate corresponding to a given value on the Y-axis represents the risk level that with probability y is less than or equal to the true but unknown value of risk. For example, the curves intersect at approximately y= 0.5, so there is roughly a 50% chance that either risk is less than about 1.3 x 10-5 (see Table 5 for a tabular representation of this figure). The red curve lies below the blue curve above y= 0.5, which means that as one approaches 'worst-case" conditions, unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) is (much) riskier than aflatoxin (e.g., there is a 5% chance the risk of aflatoxin exceeds 1 x 10-4, whereas continuing horizontally from y= 0.95, the UDMH curve is not intersected until the risk level equals 2 x 10-4). 
The central tendency estimates (both the median and the mode) ofthis ratio are virtually indistinguishable from 1:1. This indicates a comparative risk for apple juice consumption at least an order of magnitude higher than any of the point estimates cited (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) . Contrasting this result with previous risk comparisons reveals another intrinsic flaw in the use of point estimates. Because previous investigations failed to place the point estimates of inputs and results in context (i.e., were they central, lower-bound, or upper-bound numbers?), it is unclear whether the difference between 18:1 and 1:1 is due to a shift in the conservativeness of these estimators, due to changes in the input data (e.g., the newer bioassay of UDMH), or both.
More important than any single estimate of the comparative risk is the large uncertainty revealed here to affect that comparison. It happens that the central estimate of this particular risk ratio is so close to unity that it is clearly reckless to conclude that either risk is definitely greater than the other. The faint signal that aflatoxin may on average be 1.03 times riskier than UDMH is far outweighed by the "noise" in the comparison, which extends over four orders of magnitude at a 90% confidence level (from 376:1 in favor of aflatoxin to 34:1 in favor of Alar, a difference of a factor of 12,700). A nonparametric measure of the amount of overlap in the two risks was also computed to supplement this comparison of the median of the risk ratio to its own variance. By the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (46) , the two risk PDFs are indistinguishable (z = 0.525, p = 0.3), so the hypothesis that the two PDFs are different must be rejected. Readers who sense that there is a paradox here (how can the two risks be simultaneously "the same" and yet differ by 30 or 300-fold?) may be caught in a semantic trap. There is no inconsistency in believing both parts of that statement. It is the distributions that are statistically indistinguishable; since the true value of either risk could fall anywhere within its own PDF, two independent risks with similar PDFs may, in fact differ wildly.
The major point of this article (and of improving CRA in general) is not to engage in "dueling point estimates," but to progress beyond any single point estimate comparison by changing the currency with which risks are expressed. In other words, this analysis shows that 18:1, 1:1, 1:18, and other answers are all legitimate, but that none of them alone expresses the risk correctly. Assuming this analysis is computationally sound, the only informative way to express the comparative risk of aflatoxin and Alar is to acknowledge the multiplicity of legitimate quantitative conclusions. A statement such as "to a reasonably high degree of confidence, aflatoxin is no more than 376 times riskier than Alar; on the other hand, Alar could be as much as 34 times riskier than aflatoxin" (see Table 5 ) has the virtue of candor and of revealing the complexity of any decision to control (or be concerned about) one or the other substance preferentially. Its drawback, that it does not lend itself to black-and-white conclusions, is equally prominent, but one must balance the tidiness of a point estimate such as 18:1 against the virtual certainty that Meanb 4.60 x 10-5 2.72 x 10-5 UMDH, unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine aNote that the values in the third column of numbers are not simply the quotients of the numbers in the first and second columns; the third column contains the summary statistics of a separate probability density function (PDF) derived from the Monte Carlo simulation that takes into account the possibility that one risk truly lies in the left-hand tail of its own PDF while the other true value lies in its own right-hand tail (and, with equivalent probability, vice versa).
bNote that the arithmetic mean of the distribution of ratios is a nonsensical statistic, and hence is not reported here. Since ratios are inherently geometric (as opposed to arithmetic) quantities, their arithmetic mean gives disproportionate weight to cases where the numerator exceeds the denominator, and is thus entirely an artifact of which risk is placed in the numerator (i.e., the means of A/B and of B/A might both be greater than 1).
other comparative risk estimates (and hence other social or personal decisions) are at least equally valid.
The impact of the uncertainty on the comparative risk assessment is robust to computational differences between this and previous analyses and to assumptions about the human carcinogenicity of UDMH. Again, even though the contrast between 18:1 and 1:1 is subsidiary to the larger difference between point estimates and expressions acknowledging uncertainty, Figure 2 reveals that even if this analysis suffered from a hidden systematic flaw that biased it toward overstating the relative risk of UDMH (which I argue is not a strong possibility), the general point still stands that a facile comparison is vulnerable to serious error. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that such a hidden flaw was found and the entire PDF in Figure 2 was shifted 18-fold to the left (that is, matching the central tendency exactly to Ames's 18:1 estimate). There would still be a roughly 10% chance that apple juice was riskier than peanut butter, and a roughly 1% chance it was more than 10 times riskier. Similarly, even cetiln.Tesaheihtown bthehitwogaarrows) point x=de5note the 1rela epetiveprb ily.o t might contribute to an overstatement of the total uncertainty in the comparison. Notably, the use of the entire distribution of measured residue data implicitly assumes that some consumers ingest products with high (or low) contaminant levels day after day, rather than being exposed at random to the whole spectrum of contaminant concentrations over long periods. Because residue levels are correlated to some degree with brand name and with geographic market, this assumption may not be far off the mark. Similarly, the ingestion rates for peanut butter and apple juice may not be statistically independent. If avid consumers of one product tend to be high consumers of the other (the more peanut butter ingested, the more liquid needed to wash it down?), this analysis would overstate the variability in the ratio of the two exposures. Using alternative assumptions or data sets could also shift the entire PDF upwards or downwards (without affecting its variance). For example, the central estimate of the UDMH/aflatoxin ratio would increase by approximately a factor of two if the tumor site chosen by CalEPA (40) was used to analyze the UDMH bioassay data, and it would have increased further if more recent data reflecting increased apple juice consumption in the United States during the 1980s had been available or if residue levels in "apple juice for infants" had been included (31) Table 5 suggests, then each year there ed for less than 2 would be at least 25 excess deaths attributiral life span (48) .
able to UDMH exposure in this subgroup. is. Rather, it illusIronically, despite the various differpoint: arguments ences in the underlying data and despite the nt of uncertainty fact that this is a quantitative uncertainty of the practice of analysis rather than a point-estimation exersk ratios via point cise, the UCL in Table 5 is very close to the ) possible impreci-"plausible upper bound" of 1 in 4,000 that sis undertaken here the Natural Resources Defense Council s result from previcomputed for UDMH in its muchabout which point maligned "Intolerable Risk" report (49 In this hypothetical case, you might be content to be only reasonably sure that apples were less caloric than oranges, given that even the worst portion of the rest of the distribution (the apple really has 1 0 calories to the orange's 60) does not lead to a decision costly enough to outweigh the benefits of being right on average. On the other hand, high stakes and/or asymmetries in the decision problem make it more important for the thoughtful decisionmaker or risk communicator to consider the full range of possibilities and carefully evaluate which decision is best, rather than simply which risk is larger.
For the practical rather than the intellectual exercise, risk management thus involves, among other goals, trying to minimize the regret associated with the chosen option (where "regret" is a personal judgment related to the various costs incurred if the option chosen turns out to be inferior to another available one) (52) . In the Alar/aflatoxin example, the question of which risk is worse is only a proxy for the real question of what to do about either or both substances. In the latter context, and given the results in Table 5 , the individual or the regulator must balance, say, the 5% chance that ignoring or delaying action on Alar would erroneously leave unaddressed a problem 34 times greater than aflatoxin, against an equal chance that the opposite decision would focus attention on a problem 376 times smaller than aflatoxin (or, assuming that nothing more can be done about the natural carcinogen, the choice becomes one between some probability of spending resources on a problem manyfold smaller than a background risk already accepted by society, versus ignoring a problem erroneously deemed smaller than the tolerated risk). Again, needlessly definitive statements that one of these risks is exactly x times worse than the other robs the listener of the knowledge that the simplistic choice might be wrong by any criterion he might use to value the risks.
Second, decision-makers and analysts also need to understand that there is nothing wrong with using point estimates to inform and simplify their tasks. After all, the quantitative aspect of environmental decisions hinges on numbers, not on abstract curves that subsume an infinite set of discrete estimates. But different kinds of point estimates are appropriate for different decision-making goals, and the unwitting choice of an estimate can confound the decision. For example, if the decisionmaker's goal here was simply to maximize the probability of addressing the larger risk, then the median of the risk-ratio PDF would be the appropriate anchor, and either of the possible decisions would have a virtually identical error rate. If the goal instead was to minimize the expected cost of the decision (assuming cost was proportional to the true absolute difference between the two risks, so that incorrectly ignoring a much larger risk would be costlier than ignoring a slightly larger risk), then a comparison of the means of each PDF would be appropriate, and Alar would emerge as the higher priority. And if the goal was to minimize the chance of an extremely bad decision, the appropriate choice of a summary point estimate would depend on whether the decision-maker was more averse to gross errors of overspending or underprotecting (or to errors that favor ignoring a deliberately added contaminant versus those that favor ignoring a naturally occurring toxin). Because the UDMH risk distribution has both a longer right-hand tail and a longer left-hand tail than the aflatoxin PDF, either risk could be the priority depending on which percentile (near the 5th or near the 95th) corresponded to the eventuality the decision-maker particularly wished to avoid.
Finally, optimal decision-making requires careful attention to the twin influences of uncertainty and interindividual variability. The latter is a property of the system being studied which causes different estimates to be valid for different individuals (and which is generally irreducible through further study); the former is a property of the investigator (and his limited knowledge of the system) which generally can be reduced through further study (18) . The results presented to this point deliberately intermingle uncertainty and variability. For societal decision-making, the two phenomena can be usefully combined. The PDFs in Table 5 essentially represent the uncertainty in risk to a person selected at random from the exposed population. Thus, the fact that the 95th percentile risk estimate for UDMH is 1.83 x 10-4 does not necessarily mean that 5% of the population faced risks at this level or higher, nor does it necessarily mean there was a 5% chance everyone's risk was this large; rather, it means that knowing nothing about the consumption habits or exposure history of an individual, there is a 5% chance his or her individual risk was above this value.
Similarly, the mean of 4.6 x 10-5 can be interpreted as 1/Ntimes the expected number of excess deaths in a random population of Npersons exposed to UDMH.
The PDFs summarized in Table 5 individual's relative risk due to residue 1ev-els might to some extent be clarified, as government or private organizations could analyze and publish the variation in residue levels by region, brand, or type of product (e.g., store-bought peanut butter versus the more highly contaminated "grind-yourown") (29) . And, at least in the case of aflatoxin risk, motivated citizens could learn more about their own biologic susceptibility (to the extent that tests for hepatitis B virus antibodies accurately indicate higher risk).
Social decision-makers can also profit from attempts to decouple uncertainty and variability, as they can then intelligently rephrase the questions at hand. The questions of whether aflatoxin is riskier than Alar In considering how to compare risk statistics, on the other hand, it is only slightly more difficult to do it well than to do it badly. At a minimum, analysts should estimate and communicate some measure of the lower and upper bounds of each risk ratio, rather than just a measure of central tendency or a qualitative pronouncement about which risk is definitely "worse." In cases where one risk is almost certainly larger than another, this mode of communication should reinforce the distinction and increase confidence and trust (e.g., risk A is at least 10 times larger than risk B, and may be as much as 500 times larger). In other cases such as the Alar/aflatoxin example, where the lower and upper bounds reveal an ambiguous rank order, this fact should not be hidden, but turned from an adversary into an ally by one simple step: admitting that any rank ordering or any decision that flows from it will not be iron-clad, but 
